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IS THE JURY SYSTEMI A FAILURE?
IN a recent number of a leading American Magazine (The Century, Nov. 1882), a gentleman widely known as a writer upon
politico-legal matters, discusses this subject with great brilliancy.
Doubtless he is more or less right in the answer which he expects
to his question. Still, as a distinguished judge once repeated to
his class of law students: "The trouble with the opposition to the
jury system is that no one has ever been able to suggest anything
else so good for a compulsory mode'of trying a man before the bar
of justice." In the article referred to there is a suggestion made,
which in view of the vast and growing importance of the subject
merits all possible attention.
It is perhaps odd that this writer finds the chief merit of the
jury system just where it is most generally condemned. Examine
the journals of the day, just after an important trial, resulting in
a disagreement-the Star Route case for instance-and you are
likely to find criticisms, more or less severe, upon the feature of
unanimity in jury trials. That one stubborn, one corrupted man,
can paralyze the opinions of eleven others and keep justice waiting,
sometimes seems monstrous, and gives rise to proposals for verdicts
by a majority more or less great. But'our article enumerates two
and only two meritorious features of the jury system; that the
verdict is the decision of several men, and that it is their unaniVOL. XXXI.-11
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oicus decision. This latter feature, indeed, the writer thinks, is all
which has made the jury an endurable thing.
There are three methods of trial usually known to the law, viz.:
by a jury, by the judges in open court, and by a referee. The article in question makes a practical and simple suggestion : that juries
should be abolished, that a court composed like the New York Court.
of Appeals, of seven selected men, learned in the law, should try
all the causes, hearing the witnesses, and, after taking ample time
to consider, should render a decision upon law and fact which should
admit of no appeal.
Would such a tribunal give any better satisfaction than the present system ? A few considerations, only, not professing to be
exhaustive, are all which are here meant to be submitted.
Through the whole system of our jurisprudence runs a clear distinction between law and fact. The law, as a science, consists of
a collection of principles, the object of which is to group together
classes of facts which are alike, applying the same legal conclusions
to them all ; and at the same time to select out those classes of
facts which seem to belong under a given principle but really do
not, placing such where they actually belong. As a process it
may be compared to the tests for color blindness applied by some
experts. Courts sit, as it were, to sort out from a tangled pile of
worsted, the many-colored filaments of law, while now and then
some color-blind counsel lays before, the judges a bundle of red
yarns containing one bright green thread, the principle connected
with the case at bar, and the labor of the court consists in picking
out the green thread which counsel could not see in its true color,
and placing it where it belongs.
For the application of legal principles with any degree of certainty, it is needed that the facts should be determined, or else
assumed. The great benefit which we derive from courts is not in
their deciding the cases which actually come before them, but
because in doing this once they decide a thousand other cases which
never come before them. It is for the interest of the Commonwealth
not only that the courts should do justice to individuals but that
the lawyers should become well informed as to how the judges will
decide in similar concerns. When, therefore, our author complains
that the Court of Appeals only reverses the verdict of the jury
because there was error, and thus sends the case back for the committing of more error, be forgets that the court has probably
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settled some important principle which will be thereafter the guide
of hundreds of lawyers in advising clients, and may possibly prevent the bringing or defence of scores of actions.
If the decision of a Court of Appeals were merely the decision
of the rights of those particular suitors, there might bereason in a
suggestion that it should be made at the outset of the cause. But
being what it is, there is much reason in having such a court what
the combined experience of ages has made it, a court of last resort.
For such a purpose it is best that the law should be certain, even
if it may be slow; that the final authority upon legal principles
should be one court, and not many courts, so that there may be as
near an approach as possible to absolute oneness in the character
of the opinions. Even in New York, when there was a commission
of appeals, as well as the court, a diversity in their decisions began
to be noticed, which threatened confusion to the lawyers, and litigation to their clients. What would be the effect, then, if a separate Court of Appeals sat in each county, with numerous branches
in the city of New York, and there was no superior authority to
mould into one system the divergent reasoning of these different
minds ?
If the opposite ways in which the courts of different states have
decided the same identical questions is an evil, then such a system
would be a vastly greater evil, the malevolent influence of which
would reach hundreds of citizens whose fortunes or liberties never
will come within the influence of a jury.
That one court of seven members could hear all the causes tried,
even in the smallest state is, of course, impossible. But even if it
could, is that the best way to get justice: to have the same tribunal pass upon both law and fact? We have just tried to demonstrate that the proposed court would be a bad one as to establishing
the law; how as to finding the facts. On this point, the opinions of
practitioners are likely to differ ; but the experience of the writer
leads him to this result. A case is likely to be decided more justly
on its facts, by a judge or referee, when the person deciding does
not feel that he is really deciding it at all. There is such a responsibility upon the trier, especially in a case of importance or where
the parties are influential, that a trier who is to have such causes
continually coming up before him shrinks from actually deciding
the case itself. He can render more perfect justice if he may simply state the conclusions of fact which he derives -fromthe evidence,
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not pretending to say whether they entitle the plaintiff or the defendant to recover; and the judge can lay down the principles of
the law more satisfactorily if the facts are found for him, and are
beyond all temptation to alter in order to suit the intended applica
tion of the law. Legal principles rely for their sanction upon the
common approbation of legal minds, to whom it makes no difference
whether the facts are imaginary, as with the Civil and Roman law
wi-iters, or real, as in the English law. And for the same reason
facts are more easily found and with less temptation to error, if the
legal result of them is not known to the one who settles them. \His
very ignorance of the law may be the best support of his honesty.
Therefore, it has seemed to the writer that a court is not a good tribunal to settle both law and fact, because you cannot tell from their
decision which is which, because they know too much law, and are
prone to see the facts too much in their legal aspect; and because
the long-continued decision by the same men, of questions of fact
which cannot become the subject of legal criticism, as reported
opinions may, tends naturally to arouse distrust and dissatisfaction
on the part of defeated suitors. And herein lies part of the great
strength of the jury system which, to the writer's mind, goes a long
way to account for its survival-the fact that it is nearly always a
tribunal of new men against whom no prejudices have arisen in the
minds of the suitors.
No one will deny that grave objections exist against the jury
system. But the question is "Shall it be abolished ?" and if so
what shall be substituted in its place. To the mind of the writer
the remedy seems rather in some method which shall emphasize the
distinction between law and fact, as herein pointed out, introducing
perhaps some new class of triers, trained in the weighing of evidence, though not necessarily in the distinguishing of legal principles, who may settle the facts but not the law. It seems as if a
separation rather than a blending were what the cause of justice
needs.
HENRY A. HARMAN.

